Cracks in the Foundation: NATO's New Troubles by Stanley Kober
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is
beginning to fracture. Its members, sharing the
triumphalism that underpinned U.S. foreign pol-
icy after the Cold War, took on burdens that have
proved more difficult than expected. Increasingly,
they are failing to meet the challenges confronting
them.
The principal problem is Afghanistan. After
the United States was attacked on September 11,
2001, NATO for the first time invoked Article V,
its pledge that an attack against one member
country would be considered an attack against all.
But NATO’s forces are being relentlessly attacked
by the Taliban, and among NATO countries pop-
ular support for maintaining troops there is fad-
ing. If NATO fails in Afghanistan, the conse-
quences could be as damaging for its survival as
the Vietnam War was for the now defunct
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
There are a number of other problems, which
may not reach the importance of Afghanistan, but
which nevertheless pose serious complications.
These include the proposed deployment of anti-
ballistic missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic;
a potential flashpoint in Kosovo, where the
Albanian majority’s insistence on independence
could divide alliance members; and the growing
tension between Russia and some of its neighbors.
NATO’s inability to deter a cyber attack that virtu-
ally paralyzed NATO member Estonia’s access to
the internet—an attack evidently launched from
Russia but without any clear link to the Russian
government—raises questions about the alliance’s
ability to protect its newest members.
In short, NATO is facing new challenges, and
the future of the alliance is unclear. The United
States should begin discussions with our allies
about what a post-NATO world would look like.
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Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the bedrock of American foreign policy since
the Second World War, is showing signs of
severe stress. The members of the alliance,
sharing the triumphalism that underpinned
U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War, have
taken on an assortment of problematic oblig-
ations, and increasingly they are failing to
meet the resulting challenges.
This situation is a result of lessons drawn
from the end of the Cold War, which was wide-
ly thought to be a product of the West’s supe-
rior strength. To be sure, that was part of the
story, but only part. The Cold War ended when
the Soviets concluded that Communism did-
n’t work. “The U.S. did not win a Cold War
against the USSR,” explains Russian commen-
tator Pyotr Romanov. “The USSR lost it to the
U.S.” Communism didn’t bury us because it
couldn’t, since it was a system of economic
mismanagement. “Decay and inefficiency were
genetically programmed into the Communist
system. For this reason, its disintegration start-
ed at birth.”1
Nevertheless, the dominant view in the
West is that we won the Cold War through our
superior strength, especially military strength.
That assumption has had three important
consequences. First, NATO assumed addi-
tional burdens by taking in new members
from the former Soviet bloc. The idea was to
provide them the protection the European
members of NATO had enjoyed during the
Cold War. “Anxieties among Russia’s neigh-
bors about how Moscow will handle its rela-
tions with them have only grown in the last
several months,” Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott told a conference at Stanford
University in November 1998. He urged
Russia to reject “a sphere of influence” policy.2
But all countries have more influence in
their own neighborhood than in remote
areas of the world, and as long as power pre-
vails over law in international relations, great
powers will have spheres of influence. “Poor
Mexico,” a popular saying goes. “So far from
God; so close to the United States.” Russia’s
neighbors have even more cause to lament.
Geography is a reality, and as NATO gets
closer geographically to Russia, its power
wanes while Russia’s increases. In the 1990s,
when Russia was prostrate, the disparity in
power was so great that this factor was not
appreciated, but with Russia regaining its
strength while NATO’s power is focused in
other regions, one wonders how NATO could
make good on its guarantees if challenged.
Second, NATO’s expansion antagonized
Russia, which thought its goodwill in ending
the Cold War had not been reciprocated.
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov referred
to this sentiment when he wrote that “various
attempts are being made to contain Russia,
including through the eastward expansion of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in vio-
lation of previous assurances given to
Moscow.”3
What were these assurances? Russians, with
some American support, insist that when the
Cold War ended and they agreed to the reuni-
fication of Germany within NATO, they
received verbal assurances that NATO would
not expand further. “Any extension of the zone
of NATO is unacceptable,” Soviet president
Mikhail Gorbachev told Secretary of State
James Baker in 1990. “I agree,” Baker replied.4
But there is some confusion about what the
discussions actually meant, especially since
positions changed over time. The Russians
were furious they had been careless or, worse,
misled. “The current collision between Russia
and NATO could have been avoided if the
Soviet leadership had at that time . . . codified
[American and German] intentions not to
expand NATO,” observed foreign affairs ana-
lyst Alexei Pushkov. “The Russian leadership is
saying that it will not be fooled again.”5
Third, by focusing on consolidating its
Cold War victory, NATO neglected the new
threats that were emerging. NATO is living
with the consequences of that attitude, as its
forces fight in Afghanistan. If NATO does not
succeed, it is possible that Afghanistan will be
its undoing just as failure in Vietnam
destroyed another American-led alliance, the
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Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
When the Cold War ended, that failure was
largely forgotten. The idea that NATO could
disappear, like SEATO before it, was not even
considered. NATO, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee during her January 1997
confirmation hearings, is “a permanent
alliance.”6 And so NATO expanded and took
on new missions, most notably in Afghanistan.
But the victory in that country that appeared
imminent at the end of 2001 now is increas-
ingly in jeopardy, and now other tensions are
beginning to weigh on alliance unity. Is it pos-
sible that NATO could go the way of SEATO?
The Mounting Troubles
in Afghanistan
When the United States was attacked on
September 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article
V—its pledge that an attack against one is an
attack against all—for the first time in its his-
tory. The U.S. government decided, however,
that the military response should be primarily
an American, rather than an alliance, matter.
Quite simply, the U.S. ability to project power
to remote Afghanistan far surpassed the capa-
bilities of other members of the alliance. In
addition, coordination is essential; if troops
have not trained together for their missions in
peacetime, the danger of friendly fire incidents
is vastly increased if they fight together in war.
The extraordinary success of the initial
military operation in Afghanistan justified
that decision, but in retrospect, it appears
that success led to overconfidence. The mas-
termind of the September 11 attack, Osama
bin Laden, escaped with a core of supporters,
which led to questions of whether sufficient
forces were devoted to capturing him. Even
worse, the Bush administration, evidently
convinced that the situation in Afghanistan
was under control, diverted resources to Iraq.
After a Promising Start, the Alliance
Stumbles
For years, as the situation in Iraq deterio-
rated, Afghanistan was regarded as the suc-
cess story. “We are in the south to help and
protect the Afghan people [as they] construct
their own democracy,” British defense secre-
tary John Reid said in April 2006. “We would
be perfectly happy to leave in three years and
without firing one shot because our job is to
protect the reconstruction.”7
To be sure, Reid did acknowledge the pos-
sibility that force might have to be used, for
that was the reason soldiers were being sent.
It is evident, however, that the British govern-
ment failed to anticipate the intensity of
combat its troops would encounter. Indeed,
in testimony before the House of Commons
defense committee, the chief of the defense
staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup,
admitted the battle in Afghanistan “would
have been lost” in 2006 in the absence of
effective close air support.8
Reliance on air support comes at a cost,
however, since there is a heightened risk of
innocent casualties, which in turn prompts
increased Afghan resentment of NATO
forces. After U.S. special forces called in air
strikes in a valley in western Afghanistan in
late April 2007, Afghan officials claimed that
approximately 100 civilians had been killed
and wounded. “Five years on, it is very diffi-
cult for us to continue accepting civilian
casualties,” President Hamid Karzai told a
news conference. “It is becoming heavy for
us; it is not understandable anymore.”9
“Caveats” and Other Problems
Ideally, NATO members could provide
more ground forces, but for the most part they
have been reluctant to do so. In August 2003,
NATO took command of the International
Security Assistance Force, which had been
established pursuant to a UN Security Council
peace-enforcement mandate. ISAF has never
seen itself as a war-fighting force; rather, it was
designed to provide assistance to the develop-
ing Afghan army and to facilitate the recon-
struction of Afghanistan following what was
thought to be the defeat of the Taliban. “To sell
their new missions at home, British, Dutch
and Canadian officials portrayed deployments
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to Afghanistan as safe, and better than sending
troops to Iraq,” the New York Times reported in
summarizing the history of the conflict.
“Germany and Italy prevented their forces
from being sent on combat missions in volatile
areas. Those regions were to be left to the
Americans, Canadians, British and Dutch.”10
Those limits on deployments are among
the many “caveats” complicating the war-fight-
ing capability of NATO in Afghanistan and
elsewhere. Other caveats include different rules
of engagement, restrictions on how aircraft can
be used, and even operational limitations on
the use of riot control agents.11 In October
2006, NATO’s Supreme Commander, Gen.
James Jones, criticized Turkey for not allowing
its forces to operate outside of Kabul.12 And in
March 2007, the German Defense Minister,
Franz-Josef Jung, bluntly stated that “there will
be no shifting of our troops from north to
south,” where most of the fighting is taking
place in Afghanistan.13 As then–secretary of
defense Donald Rumsfeld told a NATO meet-
ing in September 2005, “Clearly, if you’re a
NATO commander in command of an opera-
tion where there are different rules of engage-
ment and different restrictions on national
forces, it makes it enormously difficult for him
to command that force.”14
Calls for additional troops or for lifting the
“caveats” have met with modest responses,
provoking complaints of unfair burden shar-
ing. “When you go on an operation as com-
plex and dangerous as this, where some
NATO nations are not playing a full part,”
there is “huge resentment” among troops
putting their lives on the line while “others are
not,” complained Lord Inge, commander of
the British armed forces in the 1990s.15
Indeed, the House of Commons Select
Committee on Defense has bluntly stated that
it “remain[s] deeply concerned that the reluc-
tance of some NATO members to provide
troops for the ISAF mission is undermining
NATO’s credibility and ISAF operations.”16
The Resurgence of the Taliban
On this side of the Atlantic, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice has warned that
Afghanistan “could come back to haunt us” if
NATO failed and the Taliban came to power
again.17 That possibility, which seemed
unthinkable six years ago, can no longer be
excluded. Even Kabul is now experiencing
bombings. “Every month there’s a 20 to 25
percent increase in offensive activity,” reports
Nic Lee, director of the Afghanistan NGO
safety office, a project funded by the European
Commission. Lee claimed that attacks in June
and July 2007 were 80–90 percent higher than
in the same period last year.18 A suicide attack
in November killed six legislators—a sign that
the Taliban is adopting tactics such as road-
side bombs and suicide bombers that have
proved so effective and difficult to counter in
Iraq.19 Poppy cultivation has soared, providing
the Taliban with a lucrative source of income
and presenting NATO with a terrible dilem-
ma: attempt to eradicate the poppy and there-
by alienate the farmers who grow it, or allow
the poppy to flourish and the Taliban to prof-
it. Efforts to find alternative crops have so far
proved of limited success, so the dilemma con-
tinues. And as Lord Inge told the House of
Lords last July, “if we fail in Afghanistan then
Pakistan goes down.”20
But if Afghanistan affects the stability of
Pakistan, the situation in Pakistan, especially
in its border areas, also affects the security situ-
ation in Afghanistan. As the United States dis-
covered in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, insur-
gencies with secure sanctuaries are extraordi-
narily difficult, if not impossible, to defeat. The
existence of such a sanctuary in Pakistan is the
focus of NATO’s concern. In testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
General Jones called Quetta, the capital of
Pakistan’s Balochistan province, the headquar-
ters of the Taliban.21 Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf has acknowledged the threat.
“There is no doubt Afghan militants are sup-
ported from Pakistan soil,” he admitted while
visiting Kabul in August 2007. “The problem
that you have in your region is because support
is provided from our side.”22
The question now is what the Pakistani
government can do. Deals made with the
Taliban appear to be backfiring, and “far
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from achieving peace in the tribal areas or in
Afghanistan, it seems these deals now threat-
en peace in Pakistan itself.”23 Pakistani com-
mentators wonder aloud about the ability of
the state to impose control, as religious
extremists defy government authority even in
the capital, Islamabad. On November 3,
2007, President Pervez Musharraf declared
an emergency and suspended the constitu-
tion. “Pakistan is on the verge of destabiliza-
tion,” he warned. “Inaction at this moment is
suicide for Pakistan and I cannot allow this
country to commit suicide.”24
The deteriorating situation in Pakistan
represents a grave threat to NATO operations
in Afghanistan. Supply lines in Pakistan are
coming under attack: in one incident in May
2007, as many as 10 trucks transporting fuel
to coalition forces were destroyed. According
to a report in the Frontier Post (Peshawar), these
attacks are becoming “a routine business.”25 If
such a situation continues, NATO will have to
look for other supply routes. Given the poor
relations with Iran, that means looking to
Afghanistan’s northern border, which means
increased reliance on Russia. 
Ironically, the success of NATO’s mission
in Afghanistan could thus rest in Moscow’s
hands. After September 11, Vladimir Putin’s
government cooperated with the United
States against the Taliban, but the relatively
good relations that prevailed at that time have
frayed significantly. Although Russia still
would have an incentive to cooperate, because
it also views the Taliban as an enemy, it pre-
sumably would exact a price related to some of
its other disputes with the United States and
NATO. Unfortunately, the relationship has
now become burdened with a number of
issues, of which the most important are mis-
sile defense, Kosovo, and Estonia.26
Missile Defense Creates
New Tensions
In December 2001, President Bush an-
nounced that the United States was withdraw-
ing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that
had been in effect for almost 30 years. He
argued that the treaty was a relic of the Cold
War and that missile defenses were now neces-
sary to deal with threats from terrorists and
rogue states. In reply, President Putin acknowl-
edged that the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty
did not threaten Russia’s security, but he nev-
ertheless regarded the decision as a “mis-
take.”27
That judgment has hardened since the
United States announced it wanted to deploy
anti-missile facilities in the Czech Republic
and Poland to provide protection against
Iranian missiles. The Russian government
has ridiculed that rationale, denouncing the
proposed deployment as designed to counter
Russian missiles and rejecting proposals for
cooperation. According to Russian foreign
minister Lavrov, “any unilateral steps, espe-
cially those taken in haste, are effectively set-
ting the stage for a new division of Europe.”28
The warning about a new division of
Europe evokes images of a return to the Cold
War. Moscow has warned that it will increase
its offensive missile capabilities to offset any
defensive deployments, and it has suspended
participation in the treaty on conventional
forces in Europe. “Some European countries
are flagrantly violating CFE [Conventional
Forces in Europe] provisions, whereas Russia
has fewer weapons in its treaty zone than it is
allowed to have,” claims Russian commenta-
tor Pyotr Goncharov. Linking the two dis-
putes, he adds that “it would make sense for
European countries to heed Russia’s griev-
ances over the ABM issue.”29
Intra-Alliance Tensions
Russia is not alone in voicing concerns.
NATO’s secretary general has warned that by
approaching Poland and the Czech Republic
to safeguard its own security, the United States
risks creating two levels of security within
NATO itself. “For me the indivisibility of secu-
rity is key,” Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stressed.
“When it comes to missile defense, there
shouldn’t be an A-league and a B-league with-
in NATO.”30 Some NATO members, notably
in “old” Europe, have also voiced objections.
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German officials, in particular, have expressed
nervousness about where the U.S. policy might
lead. “Our top priority remains disarmament
and not an arms buildup,” Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier has written. “We
don’t want a new arms race in Europe.”31
In addition, although the top leaders of the
Czech Republic and Poland have expressed
support for the ABM system, uneasiness is
bubbling beneath the surface. “Almost every
public survey conducted in recent months has
shown around 60 percent of Czechs opposed
to the radar base,” the BBC reports.
“According to the country’s leading polling
agency STEM, those ‘strongly against’ far out-
weigh those ‘strongly in favor.’”32 Similarly, a
majority of respondents to a poll in Poland
opposed the deployment.33 The manner in
which the U.S. government pushed the ABM
system provoked an outraged reaction from
the Polish defense minister, who resigned.
“Some genius at the State Department or the
Pentagon sent the first official note describing
possible placement of the facility with a draft
reply attached,” Radek Sikorski wrote in a
stinging article in the Washington Post. “If the
Bush administration expects Poles and Czechs
to jump for joy and agree to whatever is pro-
posed, it’s going to face a mighty crash with
reality.”34
In short, the ABM proposal is already
dividing NATO, and Putin is exploiting those
divisions with his proposal to base the ABM
radar in Azerbaijan rather than the Czech
Republic. As a report in the Hindu stressed,
Putin’s proposal, which also included basing
interceptor missiles closer to Iran, was
designed to facilitate a cooperative European
approach to European security. “A missile
shield built near the Iranian borders would
cover all of Europe, rather than just a part of
it as would be the case with missiles deployed
in Poland under the U.S. plan,” Vladimir
Radyuhin wrote from Moscow. “The wreck-
age of missiles intercepted in the early stages
after launch from Iran would fall into the sea,
rather than on the heads of Europeans.”35
In other words, Putin is telling the
Europeans, “The Americans are designing a
system for themselves, not for you, but my
plan would protect you.” The question is
whether the United States will be able to hold
its allies in line, or whether Putin will be suc-
cessful in sowing division.
The New Kosovo Crisis
In 1999, following NATO’s war against
Serbia (Yugoslavia), the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution authorizing the establish-
ment of an international civil and security pres-
ence under UN auspices in Kosovo. “Reaffirm-
ing the commitment of all Member States to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” Resolution
1244 specified that the UN presence was
intended “to provide an interim administration
for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo
can enjoy substantial autonomy within the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”36
Reneging on a Commitment
Nevertheless, in March 2007 Marti Ahtisaari,
the UN secretary general’s special envoy for
Kosovo, recommended that Kosovo be put on a
path for supervised independence. Further
negotiation, he had concluded, was pointless.
“Both parties have reaffirmed their categorical,
diametrically opposed positions,” he explained,
and the Kosovars would not agree to remain
within Serbia. “This is a reality one cannot deny;
it is irreversible.”37
The proposal immediately ran into oppo-
sition from Russia, which urged further
negotiation to achieve an outcome agreeable
to both sides. Commenting on the Ahtisaari
plan, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman
Mikhail Kamynin said in March 2007 that “it
is important to continue impartial consulta-
tions and to steadily expand the sphere of
agreement between the negotiating parties in
the interests of finding solutions to the prob-
lems on the basis of Resolution No. 1244 of
the U.N. Security Council and principles of
international law.”38
Two questions arise here. First, what does
international law require? According to
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Kosovo’s prime minister, Agim Ceku, “the
UN Charter and all other relevant statements
of international law underline the pre-emi-
nence of self-determination.”39 But if that is
the case, how can self-determination be
denied to other peoples who might demand
it? Already, Russia is arguing that Kosovo
would set a precedent for other indepen-
dence movements, and Ceku’s interpretation
of international law would appear to rein-
force that contention.
Second, who decides what international
law is relevant in such a matter? The Russians
are saying that the United Nations, and espe-
cially the Security Council, decide on these
issues. It would appear the United States
agreed with that view, for otherwise why did
it turn to the Security Council following the
war in Kosovo? But now the U.S. government
is arguing that if the Security Council cannot
reach agreement, it can be ignored. “When
does the process end?” President Bush asked
rhetorically during a visit to Albania last
June, answering, “The time is now. . . .We’re
going to have to move. Independence is the
goal, and that’s what the people of Kosovo
need to know.”40
Thus, the question here concerns a funda-
mental issue of the post–Cold War order.
“We’re now in sight of a United Nations that
performs as envisioned by its founders,”
President George H. W. Bush famously told
Congress on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War.41
The hope was that the end of the Cold War
divisions would lead to a world based on the
rule of law. The corresponding fear was that
a failure of the rule of law could lead to new
divisions and tensions, including some that
Americans did not expect.
Russia—and Others—Cite International
Law
The Russian emphasis on law might
appear to some as insincere, but it defines a
fundamental issue: if we are not governed by
the rule of law, in which all are equal before the
law, then might makes right. When NATO
ignored the requirement for a UN Security
Council Resolution authorizing its bombing
campaign in Kosovo, arguing that the moral
imperative to prevent genocide overrode the
language of the UN Charter, the Russians
were unhappy, but they agreed to support
Resolution 1244. If that resolution is now dis-
regarded, they will likely conclude that the
Western countries follow the law when it suits
their interests, and ignore it when it doesn’t.
And they will not be the only ones. Last
February, as Ahtisaari was preparing to pre-
sent his plan, the foreign ministers of Russia,
China, and India met in New Delhi. They
“expressed their conviction that democrati-
zation of international relations is the key to
building an increasingly multi-polar world
order that would be based on principles of
equality of nations—big or small, respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity of coun-
tries, international law and mutual respect,”
according to the official communiqué. “The
Ministers acknowledged that the UN is an
appropriate instrument for promoting and
attaining such a world order.”42
Although that communiqué was all but
ignored in the West, its language suggests that
China and India share Russia’s concerns.
Indeed, in China’s case, that is to be expected.
Just as Resolution 1244 is the test of American
sincerity regarding Kosovo, the Shanghai
communiqué negotiated between U.S. and
Chinese leaders on the occasion of President
Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 is the
test of American sincerity regarding the
ambiguous relationship between China and
Taiwan.43 It would hardly be surprising if the
Chinese were watching this issue and thinking
to themselves: If the Americans disregard a
Security Council resolution, why should we
believe they won’t disregard the Shanghai
communiqué?
The Indian perspective is more surprising
given the upturn in U.S.-India relations, a pri-
ority of the Bush administration. The key
here may be found in the term “mutual
respect.” Although the Indians are keen to
improve their relationship with the United
States, they are sensitive to any action that
appears disrespectful: for example, they have
sharply rejected Washington’s objections to
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New Delhi’s plans for a pipeline with Iran.44
Consequently, they might be watching
Kosovo and thinking: If this is the lack of
respect the United States shows Russia, a per-
manent member of the Security Council,
how will Washington treat us if it becomes
too powerful?
In short, the New Delhi communiqué sug-
gests that the repercussions of bypassing
Resolution 1244 could reverberate well
beyond the Balkans. Moscow could argue that
by disregarding the UN Charter and the
Helsinki Final Act, which both set forth prin-
ciples concerning state sovereignty and respect
for human rights, the United States and its
allies have shown they consider themselves to
be too powerful to be restrained by mere legal
constraints.45
NATO and the Prospect of New Violence
in the Balkans
Would NATO members line up behind the
United States in the face of this challenge? The
answer is not clear, especially if violence breaks
out in Kosovo. NATO is caught in the middle
of a dilemma between the possibility of
Albanian violence if independence is not
granted, or Serbian violence if it is. It is ques-
tionable whether Serbia would meekly accept
Kosovo’s independence. “If this plan happens,
it will only give the Albanian terrorists a
chance to finish the ethnic cleansing job
against Serbs in Kosovo that has been going
on for the past seven years,” Bishop Artemije,
the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in
Kosovo, warned in Washington last February.
“Serbia will react as any democratic country
would do to the loss of its territory, and Serbs
in Kosovo will react as any occupied people
would do.”46
NATO, it should be remembered, is not the
force it was in 1999; it is now heavily involved
elsewhere. Would it be capable of handling
renewed violence? Leaders may give assur-
ances that the alliance can and would do so,
but the major question concerns the willing-
ness of the populations of the member states
to become engaged in the Balkans once again.
Already facing foreign challenges beyond what
they expected, the outbreak of violence in the
Balkans—in a conflict thought to be all but
settled—could make them wonder about the
competence of their leaders. If so, the pros-
pects for effective action—indeed, for the
future of the alliance itself—could be bleak. 
Estonia and the Perils of
Security Guarantees
Another issue that is challenging NATO is
the tense relationship between alliance mem-
ber Estonia and Russia. Earlier this year, the
Estonian government moved a Soviet-era war
memorial, which included the interred bodies
of Russian soldiers who had died in the Second
World War, from the center of Tallinn to a mil-
itary cemetery. That action provoked outrage
in Russia. The Estonian ambassador in
Moscow had to flee a gang of young thugs who
interrupted a press briefing she was giving. In
addition, computer networks in Estonia soon
were besieged by “denial of service” attacks,
which Estonia (and others) claimed were origi-
nating in Russia. “Russian Web forums posted
explicit instructions on how to overload
Estonian Web sites,” the Chicago Tribune report-
ed. “Let Estonia know that Russia will never
leave its compatriots in trouble,” it quoted
from one Russian site. “Take revenge at these
Estonian government addresses.”47
The attacks provoked a response from
NATO, which sent a team to investigate. “This
is an operational security issue, something
we’re taking very seriously,” an official at its
headquarters in Brussels said. “It goes to the
heart of the alliance’s modus operandi.”48
There are two issues to be considered here.
The first is the issue of cyber warfare. Estonia,
it turns out, is especially vulnerable because so
much of its business activity is connected to
the internet. According to the Estonian defense
minister, the effect of the attacks was like hav-
ing ports blockaded.49 Yet it is difficult to prove
responsibility. Even if the attacks are traced to
Russia, that does not by itself prove govern-
ment responsibility. “None of the sources we
have analyzed from around the world show a
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clear line from Moscow to Tallinn,” observed
Jose Nazario, a senior security engineer with
Arbor Networks. “We see signs of Russian
nationalism at work here, but no Russian gov-
ernment connection.”50
The second is what NATO can do. That
issue goes beyond the specifics of cyber war-
fare. Supposedly, once Estonia was included
in NATO, its security would be assured. The
cyber attacks indicate that argument must
now be questioned. At the very least, the cyber
attacks suggest there are ways of indirectly
challenging NATO. In other words, the logic
of deterrence must now be reexamined. As the
Economist has succinctly put it, “though [the
Baltic states] shelter in theory under the
alliance’s nuclear umbrella, in practice NATO
offers little more than moral support.”51
Athens and America
The predicament confronting Estonia,
and other small states that are located near a
much larger power, is a recurring theme in
history. Perhaps its most famous expression
is the Melian dialogue from Thucydides’s
History of the Peloponnesian War. The Melians,
confronted by the might of Athens, hoped
their position as a colony of Lacedaemon
(Sparta) would protect them. Their hopes
were in vain, as the Athenians knew the reali-
ties of the balance of power. In their ultima-
tum, the Athenians bluntly told the Melians
that “the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must.”52
During the Cold War, both sides largely rec-
ognized these realities. The United States let
the Soviet Union build the Berlin Wall. It never
recognized the incorporation of the Baltic
States into the Soviet Union, but it also never
considered using military force to free them.
But empires do not last forever; the
Athenian empire crumbled, and so did the
Soviet. It is understandable that the Estonians,
and others, who suffered terribly during the
20th century should seek assurances of securi-
ty, and Americans can only be flattered by the
trust they repose in us. It would be wonderful
if we could be worthy of that trust. But ulti-
mately the question must be asked, whether
the security of small states is guaranteed better
by alliances than by a respected system of
international law. Both have their risks, but
the history of the 20th century underlines the
danger small states assume by placing their
hopes for security in the promises of larger
countries.
The Balance of Power
In a speech to the 2002 graduating class of
West Point, President Bush unveiled a vision of
American military hegemony that would, he
argued, lead to a more peaceful world.
“America has, and intends to keep, military
strengths beyond challenge,” he proclaimed,
“thereby, making the destabilizing arms races
of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to
trade and other pursuits of peace.”53 Elaborat-
ing on this idea, then–national security adviser
Condoleezza Rice derided the idea of multi-
polarity. “Multi-polarity is a theory of rivalry;
of competing interests—and at its worst—com-
peting values,” she told the International
Institute of Strategic Studies in June 2003.
“Power in the service of freedom is to be wel-
comed, and powers that share a commitment
to freedom can—and must—make common
cause against freedom’s enemies.”54
However beguiling this idea, it runs
counter to the founding principle of the
United States that unchecked power is bound
to be abused. Our system of checks and bal-
ances is simply the domestic application of the
international concept of the balance of power.
Just as Americans would not feel safe if their
rights were guaranteed by a dictator, so people
in other countries will not trust their rights
and freedoms to the protection of a single,
unchallenged hegemon. In such a situation,
the world will divide between those who see
their protection in alignment with the super-
power, and those who feel that whatever pro-
tection might be offered in the short run is
likely to be sacrificed in the long run.
Alliances Lead to Counteralliances
At the beginning of the last century, the
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Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy
provoked the formation of the countervailing
Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia.
As Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s foreign secretary
at the time, explained in his memoirs:
It seemed incredible that [the Germans]
should not realize that, if Germany had
alliances, other countries must have
them too. . . . After the Triple Alliance
was formed Russia was isolated, France
was isolated, Britain was not only isolat-
ed, but in constant danger of war with
France or Russia. German statesmen
cannot seriously have thought that this
situation could last. France and Russia
found some comfort in an Alliance, and
at last Britain found it in an Entente.55
But it appears the Germans did not realize
the obligations the members of the Entente
felt toward each other. Concerned that Berlin
had misconstrued a statement he gave in
answer to a parliamentary inquiry, Grey “gave
the [German] Ambassador a warning that my
reply in the House of Commons must be
taken as meaning just what it said, and that it
did not preclude some intimacy on our part
with France and Russia that was like that of
Allies.”56 The warning was not heeded, and
within a few months the Triple Entente was at
war with the Triple Alliance.
History may not repeat itself exactly, but
the parallel with the post-Cold War world pro-
vides an opportunity for reflection. When the
Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact dis-
solved, Russia agreed to live with NATO—even
with a NATO that expanded to include a unit-
ed Germany. But a triumphant alliance decid-
ed it should expand and take in new members.
Incredibly, like Germany’s leaders a century
before, American leaders (and their foreign
allies) did not appreciate that alliances pro-
voke the formation of counter-alliances. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
as a Response to NATO
But as NATO has expanded, Russia’s rela-
tions with China, in particular, have grown
apace, leading initially to the formation of the
Shanghai Five and then to the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, which includes—
in addition to Russia and China—Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as full
members, and India, Iran, Mongolia, and
Pakistan as observer members.
In other words, just as the Triple Entente
gradually emerged in opposition to the Triple
Alliance, so the SCO seems to be emerging in
response to NATO expansion. And just as the
Triple Entente insisted, at least in public, that
it was not an alliance, so do the members of
the SCO. But the membership of the SCO
does not overlap with NATO, just as the mem-
bership of the Triple Alliance did not overlap
with the Triple Entente, and SCO members
conduct military exercises together just as
NATO countries do.57 In short, the world is in
danger of dividing just as Europe divided a
century ago—a process that should have been
foreseen by those who naively thought other
countries would not respond to NATO expan-
sion by taking their own corresponding mea-
sures.
The Guarantor’s
Responsibility
In his memoirs, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk described how uneasy he felt about the
creation of SEATO. “I was amazed, even dis-
mayed, by the casual way the Senate ratified
the SEATO Treaty,” he recalled. “With mas-
sive retaliation backing up our treaty obliga-
tions, we may have entered SEATO ‘on the
cheap,’ without fully recognizing the price we
might have to pay to back up our treaty
pledges.”58
SEATO was a precursor to the post-Cold
War efforts to expand NATO, since it was
based on the same premise that an American
security guarantee would provide protection.
“SEATO was a comprehensive pledge, accept-
ing responsibility for the security of the pro-
tocol states,” Rusk explained. “When the
United States signed that treaty, SEATO
became the law of the land and linked South
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Vietnam to the general structure of collective
security.”59
The parallels with the situation today are
troubling. When NATO’s members invoked
Article 5 following the September 11 attack,
they could hardly have imagined their mili-
tary operations would encounter so much
difficulty. After all, the greatest military
power the world had ever seen headed their
alliance, and Afghanistan was a poor and
weak country.
But the war was not taken seriously, and
now NATO is in difficulty. “The situation in
Afghanistan is much worse than many people
recognize,” Lord Inge told the House of Lords
on July 11, 2007. “We need to face up to that
issue, the consequences of strategic failure in
Afghanistan and what that would mean for
NATO.” Another member of the House
agreed. “When I was at NATO 18 months ago,
I found myself talking to a succession of people
in SHAPE who said that the future of NATO
now depends on success in Afghanistan,”
stressed Lord Wallace of Saltaire. “If that is the
case, we have some real questions to ask about
the future of NATO.”60
Nor are such warnings confined to
Britain. “NATO has now had to face an exis-
tential crisis of sorts,” Undersecretary of
State Nicholas Burns told the Atlantic
Council last February, accusing some NATO
members of shirking their obligations. “Too
many of our allies have said that they’re quite
willing to be garrison troops in the northern
and western parts of the country that are rel-
atively quiet and peaceful, but not willing to
come down to where the Taliban is crossing
the border in great numbers and where al
Qaeda is also taking on the American,
Afghan, and those NATO allied forces” from
Britain, Canada, Estonia, the Netherlands,
and Romania. “We need to see that effort
from the Europeans. We need to see more
European soldiers in Afghanistan, more
European money devoted to the task of
rebuilding the country.” At the same time,
however, he insisted that “NATO will contin-
ue to grow. We will continue to add members
to the NATO Alliance.”61
But is it responsible to add new members if
the fate of the alliance itself has come into
question? Our experience with SEATO
demonstrates why we must ask hard ques-
tions before, not after, we have extended secu-
rity guarantees. The fate of the Vietnamese
and the Cambodians is on our conscience, and
the Iraqis and Afghans may soon be, as well.
This is a moral issue of the highest order: we
should not make promises of protection we might not
be able to honor.
And what kind of alliance are we asking
these countries to enter? As Secretary Burns
made clear, it is an alliance that will ask its
members to send their soldiers to Afghanistan.
But that is not why the new members wanted
to join the alliance. A poll by the Pew research
group released last June revealed that 45 per-
cent of Czech respondents and 63 percent of
Polish respondents favored removing troops
from Afghanistan. Indeed, in seven of twelve
NATO members surveyed, majorities “say
troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan
as soon as possible.”62
In short, the alliance is fraying, a develop-
ment that should have been foreseen. To be
sure, the demise of NATO has been predicted
almost from its inception. But the moral of
the story of the boy who cries wolf is that
people become complacent and therefore are
caught off guard when the wolf eventually
appears.
Just such complacency has been evident
since the Cold War ended. The triumphalism
that characterized American diplomacy was
not only unrealistic; it was a contradiction of
the guidance of this country’s Founders. “The
rulers of the most powerful nation in the
world,” Alexander Hamilton warned, “will for-
ever aim at an undue empire over other
nations.” Power unconstrained would lead to
excess, arousing the suspicion and opposition
of other countries. “The spirit of moderation
in a state of overbearing power is a phenome-
non which has not yet appeared, and which no
wise man will ever expect to see,” Hamilton
explained, referring to France. “’Twere there-
fore contrary to our true interest to assist in
building up this colossus to the enormous size
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at which she aims. ’Twere a policy as short-
sighted as mean to seek safety in a sub-
servience to her views as the price of her
clemency.”63
What was true for the United States vis-à-
vis France is now true of other countries vis-à-
vis the United States. And again, this was pre-
dicted by our Founders. No less a figure than
George Washington advised the American
people in his Farewell Address to avoid the
temptation of permanent alliances, noting the
likelihood that they would lead to permanent
confrontation. Now we wonder whether the
Cold War is returning and note with concern
the support of the Russian people for Presi-
dent Putin’s more confrontational policy. It is
not the world we expected when the Berlin
Wall fell; and it remains to be seen whether the
challenges confronting NATO, including
Kosovo, missile defense, and especially Af-
ghanistan, can be surmounted.
If they are not, then NATO will, indeed,
confront an existential crisis. Failure in
Afghanistan, in particular, is likely to bring
recriminations as members of the alliance
attempt to shift the blame. Weakening
alliance solidarity will be reinforced by prob-
lems in staffing the armed forces: the U.S.
Army, for example, began the current recruit-
ing year with the fewest number of candidates
signed up for basic training since the incep-
tion of the all-volunteer force in 1973.64 The
reality of American overstretch is already being
recognized in NATO members who looked to
the U.S. as their protector. “Our American col-
leagues say not to worry, that NATO will pro-
tect us, but rhetorical assurances are too easy,”
Poland’s former defense minister Sikorski
explained in the Washington Post. “Poland is
haunted by the memory of fighting Hitler
alone in 1939 while our allies stood by.”65
The tragedy of Poland in 1939 occurred
when Britain and France casually extended
defense guarantees without taking seriously
the accompanying responsibilities. Describing
the security arrangements reached at the
October 1925 Locarno conference, Winston
Churchill wrote that “although the proposal
seemed dangerous in theory—pledging us in
fact to take part on one side or the other in any
Franco-German war that might arise—there
was little likelihood of such a disaster ever
coming to pass; and this was the best means of
preventing it.”66 Churchill at the time was
himself so confident of the stability of peace in
Europe that when he was Chancellor of the
Exchequer in 1928, he advised his colleagues
“that it should now be laid down as a standing
assumption that at any given date there will be
no major war for ten years from that date.”67
The Locarno arrangements did not pre-
vent the Second World War, and they did not
survive it. That is the typical fate of security
guarantees that prove ineffective. If NATO
fails to meet its current challenges, its sur-
vival should not be taken for granted. Given
the difficulties the alliance is confronting, it
is not too early to begin discussions with our
allies about what a post-NATO world would
look like. They have put their trust in us, and
we have an obligation to them, and to our-
selves, to face the world honestly.
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